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Abstract 
A key question at the heart of contemporary debates over interreligious dialogue is whether 
the Christian partner in such conversations should view her interlocutors through the lens of 
Christian descriptions or whether any such imaging amounts to a form of Christian 
imperialism. We look at the responses to this question from certain contemporary forms of 
‘particularism’ which regard religious universes as densely knit, and sometimes 
incommensurable, systems of meanings, so that they usually deny the significance, or even 
the possibility, of modes of Bible preaching such as apologetics. While these concerns over 
the alterity of other religious traditions are often viewed as specifically postmodern, two 
Scotsmen in British India, J.N. Farquhar (1861–1929) and A.G. Hogg (1875–1954), 
struggled exactly a hundred years ago with a version of this question vis-à-vis the religious 
universe of Vedāntic Hinduism and responded to it in a manner that has striking 
resemblances to ‘particularism’. We shall argue that Hogg can be seen as an early 
practitioner of a form of ‘comparative theology’ which emerges in his case, on the one hand, 
through a textual engagement with specific problems thrown up in interreligious spaces but, 
on the other hand, also seeks to present a reasoned defence of Christian doctrinal statements. 
We shall note a crucial difference between his comparative theological encounters and 
contemporary practitioners of the same – while the latter are usually wary of speaking of any  
‘common ground’ in interreligious encounters, Hogg regarded the presuppositions of the 
Christian faith as the basis of such encounters. The writings of both groups of theologians 
are structured by certain ‘dilemmas of difference’ that we explore. 
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A recent move in debates over religious diversity in philosophy of religion, missiology, 
theology of religions, and elsewhere is to reject attempts to subsume the religious other 
within a theoretical account of Religion, and instead to affirm the radical alterity of each of 
the religious strands of humanity. Christian theologians who adopt this standpoint often argue 
that Religion, characterised as an outdated product of the European Enlightenment, is a form 
of ethnocentric universalism which seeks to assimilate the religious traditions of the world to 
the normative homogenizing frameworks of its European origins. Instead, they assert that 
each religion is a distinctive finely-spun web of texts, traditions and teachers, and its internal 
coherence, structure and integrity must not be violated by encompassing it as one more 
instance of Religion. A key question, however, that they have to struggle with is precisely 
over the conceptualisation of the ‘alterity’ that they seek to emphasise: is it so radical that the 
other is consigned to a zone of inaccessible otherness or is it possible somehow to set up 
overlapping, criss-crossing identities through interreligious dialogue?    
 
In this essay, keeping this question in mind, we have three main objectives: first, to lay out 
the contours of the debates over ‘alterity’ among some contemporary Christian theologians; 
second, to note certain precursors of these debates among Christian missionary thinkers in 
late colonial India as they engaged with the structures of Hindu thought; and third, to 
highlight the significant conceptual shifts between the earlier debates and the contemporary 
ones. While the debates over alterity are sometimes signalled as a defining characteristic of 
postmodernity, we shall indicate that they had reached a sophisticated pitch in British 
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Christian missionary responses in the 1920s to certain aspects of Hindu thought. That is, the 
question ‘precisely how other is the other?’ is not a contemporary invention but a theological-
philosophical puzzle that several Christian theologians and missionaries grappled with in 
British India. Further, and crucially, while they were aware avant la lettre of the postmodern 
themes of incommensurability, heterogeneity, locality, and the like, they were also able to 
affirm, in realist fashion, the common unity and destiny of all humanity under Christ. 
Therefore, a key question that our essay will raise is whether interreligious dialogue is 
thwarted or enabled by the realist ‘presupposition’ of the Christian world-view that all human 
beings are in fact encompassed by the Triune God.        
 
THE ‘PRESUPPOSITIONS’ OF INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 
 
A vital theme in recent debates over interreligious dialogue is whether it is possible to hold 
together in a creative tension the demands of identity and authenticity to one’s religious 
tradition with openness to other traditions. From a broad historical perspective, we can 
identify at least three dialectical ‘turns’ in Christianity’s engagement with the religious other, 
and, more specifically, Hindu thought. Till around 1900, Christian theologians and 
missionaries usually viewed the cluster of beliefs and practices that gradually began to be 
subsumed under the label ‘Hinduism’ as the demoniac other to Christian truth, a degraded 
perversion that needed to be corrected through Christian light.
1
 From this standpoint, most 
clearly exemplified in Alexander Duff’s reference in 1839 to Hinduism as ‘a stupendous 
system of error’, 2 the emphasis falls clearly on the radical otherness of Hindu structures of 
belief and practice: the latter is defined in terms of an absence, defect or lack relative to 
Christian presence. From around the ‘turn’ of the century, however, British Protestant figures 
such as T.E. Slater and, more famously, J.N. Farquhar began to place the religions of the 
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world on a continuum, at the apex of which stood Christianity. For instance, Slater argued 
that while non-Christian religions such as Hinduism, encompassed within divine providence, 
contain ‘pre-sentiments’ of Christian truth, they are, however, are incomplete unless they are 
fulfilled in Christianity which stands at the summit of the evolutionary scale of religions.
3
 
Slater’s argument is echoed in Farquhar’s claim that the multiplicity of Hindu beliefs and 
practices reveals that there is at its heart a complex of needs, such as the one for a personal 
saviour, which can be fulfilled not within Hinduism itself but by the reality of Christ who 
alone can truly satisfy them.
4
 The basic presupposition of these strands of ‘liberal 
Protestantism’, that all human beings share certain religious aspirations which are perfectly 
fulfilled only in Christ, therefore, views the ‘alterity’ of Hindu thought in terms not of utter 
error but of perfectible intimation of Christian truth. John Hick’s ‘hypothesis’ that the major 
religious traditions of the world are orientated towards a Real an sich to which none of the 
concrete images used in these traditions apply can be seen as a late development of this mode 
of engaging with the religious other. By dropping the notion of the ‘perfectibility’ of one 
tradition in terms of another, Hick argues that human beings within their distinctive traditions 
are engaged in contexts of moral transformation from self-centredness to rootedness in the 
Real.
5
 The third ‘turn’, however, which begins to emerge from the closing decades of the last 
century, rejects the fundamental presupposition that there is an ‘underlying unity’ across the 
religious streams of humanity, and instead emphasises the radical distinctiveness of each of 
these religious traditions.
6
  
 
The group of Christian theologians whom we will discuss in this essay broadly agree that the 
maintenance of this dynamic equilibrium requires the rejection of a ‘meta-theory’ which 
would co-opt the distinctive particulars of the religious traditions within an over-arching 
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scheme of Religion, Reality, Salvation and so on, which are said to disfigure these 
specificities.
7
 Given their concern to highlight the distinctive particularities of the religious 
traditions, their tradition-shaped formations and their textually-grounded architectures, the 
label ‘particularist’ has sometimes been applied to these theologians who argue that a ‘pre-
emptive’ a priori theology of religions is often disinterested in the specifics of the aims and 
forms of life pursued by non-Christians.
8
 While, as we will note shortly, the particularists 
differ among themselves regarding the question of whether the particularities of the other 
religions can be ‘comprehended’ through conversational discourse, they strike the note that 
the assumption that the religious traditions share a ‘common ground’, staked out by 
presuppositions regarding the religious other, limits the strangeness, the novelty, and the 
uniqueness of what is being heard.
9
 By removing such presumptions from the conversation, 
the otherness of the dialogical partner should instead be acknowledged from the start, as also 
the possibility of divergences across the doctrinal statements of religious communities.
10 
 
The central question which lies at the heart of these debates over the role of ‘theory’ in 
interreligious conversations can be framed as: how much by way of ‘presupposition’ can a 
Christian theologian bring to the interreligious dialogue? Theologians in both the first and the 
second ‘turns’ operated with the ‘presupposition’ that they inhabited a world structured by 
Christian truth within which they tried to ‘locate’ religious diversity in somewhat divergent 
ways. In contrast, theologians who advocate the third ‘turn’, given their hesitation to speak in 
terms of any common ground across religious traditions, seem to suggest a ‘presupposition-
less’ point of entry into debates over religious diversity. We will note that this question 
operates as a parting of the ways between those Christian theologians who seem to respond 
‘none at all’ and other Christian theologians who affirm the centrality of a Christ-shaped 
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reality in the process of the interreligious dialogue. If we describe the former standpoint as 
‘strong particularism’ (SP) and the latter as ‘weak particularism’ (WP), their mutual 
divergence can be phrased in the following ideal-typical manner.     
 
SP: I approach the partner in interreligious dialogue without viewing her through any 
descriptions whatsoever drawn from my Christian traditions. For instance, I do not regard her 
as a ‘child of the Triune God’, and a fortiori as an individual encompassed by the saving 
reality of Christ. Every religious scheme is a densely textured universe, a semiotic system 
which shapes communitarian identity, and no such ‘translations’ can be possible across their 
incommensurable horizons.    
 
WP: I approach the partner in interreligious dialogue without viewing her through the 
structures of institutional, historical and sociological Christianity, while acknowledging that 
precisely what these structures are remains an intensely contested matter in Christian 
theological circles. However, I regard her as a ‘child of the Triune God’, even while I admit 
that she herself would not accept this description. Indeed, while even I highlight the difficulty 
of ‘translations’ across religious boundaries, I nevertheless believe that to regard an 
individual as in fact not ‘a child of the Triune God’ would be to abandon the very centre of 
Christian faith.  
 
 
In other words, the debate is over whether the doctrinal teachings of Christianity should 
retain a normative status in ‘comprehending’ religious diversity: SP would reject every 
vestige of this normativity as an intrusion of presumption, while WP sees it as an unavoidable 
aspect of religious commitment and identity.
11
 We need to highlight the ideal-typical nature 
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of this schematic distinction, for as we shall note shortly, most of the contemporary 
particularists who have contributed to debates over interreligious dialogue straddle in fact the 
boundary between SP and WP.   
 
STRONG PARTICULARISM: INCOMMENSURABILITY AND MULTIPLE 
‘SALVATIONS’ 
 
Let us begin with some contemporary Christian theologians who would seem, at least on a 
first reading, to affirm SP. According to the post-liberal theology of George Lindbeck, we 
should not strictly speak of ‘damnation’ outside the Church any more than ‘salvation’ in such 
contexts, for religions such as Christianity should be viewed along the lines of distinct 
linguistic structures into whose comprehensive frameworks individuals should be woven 
before they can begin to learn their respective grammars.
12
 Emphasising the note of 
incommensurability, Lindbeck argues that ‘when affirmations or ideas from categoreally 
different religious or philosophical frameworks are introduced into a given religious outlook, 
these are either simply babbling or else, like mathematical formulas employed in a poetic 
texts, they have vastly different functions and meanings than they had in their original 
settings’. 13  Therefore, religions should be seen in terms not of a set of propositions 
scrutinised by public reason or of inner experiences shared universally but of highly specific 
and rich categories through which reality is apprehended, experience is narrated and life is 
ordered in each of the world religions. Lindbeck rejects two models of understanding religion 
which are based on the extra-textualist assumption that all human beings have access to 
certain truths or experiences which are represented in religious texts: cognitive-
propositionalism which views religion in terms of doctrines which embody truth-claims about 
reality, and experiential-expressivism which regards religious doctrines as the expressions of 
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the life of spirituality. Instead, his cultural-linguistic model, which views religion as a 
regulative structure for reflection and conduct, is intra-textual in that the meaning of a text is 
to be located within the specific discourse which constitutes it. That is, religious concepts get 
their meaning not from entities that they supposedly refer to or from experiences that they 
may evoke, but from how they operate within a semiotic system of symbols and actions. 
Therefore, instead of viewing the Cross as a representation of a ‘universal’ experience of 
suffering, Christians will rather view suffering as cruciform – and more generally, the entire 
world is to be viewed through the spectacles of scriptural revelation.  
 
Further, according to Lindbeck, theology should be regarded as a second-order activity, along 
the lines of ‘grammar’: just as the grammar of a language is neither true nor false because it 
asserts nothing about extra-linguistic entities but stipulates rules for organizing speech and 
writing into meaningful bits, so too theological statements are not truth-claims about a pre-
existent reality but second-order regulative principles or grammatical rules of the Christian 
conceptual system.
 
 Just as one does not speak ‘language’ in general, only specific languages, 
according to Lindbeck religions should not be regarded as manifestations of a common 
essence but as highly particular singularities with distinctive, possibly even 
incommensurable, notions of truth, experience and so on. Thus Lindbeck argues: ‘Not only 
do they [the religions] no longer share a common theme such as salvation, but the shared 
universe of discourse forged to discuss that theme disintegrates … Those for whom 
conversation is the key to solving interreligious problems are likely to be disappointed’.14 
However, while Lindbeck clearly emphasises SP in these remarks, he also argues that 
eschatologically the ‘categoreal adequacy’ of Christianity will be manifested, when after 
death both believers and non-believers will be confronted by Christ for an explicit offer of 
redemption.
15
 In other words, while certain statements of Lindbeck would seem to place him 
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in SP, his overall eschatological standpoint regarding how to approach the religious other is 
WP: since the fullness of Christian truth will be revealed on the eschatological horizon, the 
religious other is in fact encompassed by Christ at all times, even if the religious other must 
not be approached with Christian descriptions pre-eschatologically.   
 
 
More schematically, the reason why particularists qua particularists cannot consistently 
affirm SP is that SP would undercut their own claims to have rejected any aspirations to 
neutral vantage-points above the fray of the world’s religious traditions. Christian theologians 
who affirm SP and who therefore cannot utilise any home-grown descriptions whatsoever 
would have to apprehend their dialogical partners as ‘bare individuals’, which is precisely the 
Enlightenment notion of abstract individuality that they otherwise reject. More concretely, a 
theologian who subscribes to SP and who encounters, say, a Vaishnavite Hindu in 
interreligious dialogue would have to engage with the following dilemma. On the one hand, 
because she cannot view her interlocutor as a ‘child of the Triune God’, she would have to 
describe her as ‘a devotee of Vishnu’. On the other hand, if she regards this appellation as an 
accurate description of the way things are, she would have to deal with the complex question 
of whether Christ and Vishnu are both ontological ultimates on the eschatological horizon, 
which she would answer in the negative insofar as she remains within the bounds of Christian 
orthodoxy. Consequently, she would have to reject the description ‘a devotee of Vishnu’ as a 
false one, and instead employ some such locution as ‘a human being’ to refer to her 
dialogical partner, which would precisely be an instance of the abstractions she would 
otherwise seek to reject. In other words, in relegating the other to a zone of radical, static and 
final inaccessibility, albeit out of respect for the integrity of the other, SP seems unwittingly 
to imply that the other is a contamination that threatens to invade the purity of the self, the 
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self which according to Christian orthodoxy is not a secure possession but a relational entity. 
Partly in response to such dilemmas, post-liberal theologians such as William Werpehowski 
have attempted to develop conversational spaces across Christianity and secular world-views, 
in this case, Marxism. Given that there are some alliances between Christians and Marxists in 
their struggles for social justice, the Christian theologian can argue that the Christian view of 
human needs, dependence and freedom is a better account of the realities that both Christians 
and Marxists accept in their different ways. Such ad hoc apologetics does not assume that 
Christian and Marxist views about religion can be translated without remainder into one 
another, or that there exist theory-neutral norms of adjudicating between these two 
perspectives on reality, and is yet able to offer various apologetic strategies for this exchange 
to take place between believer and unbeliever.
16
 Consequently, though post-liberal 
theologians are often accused by their critics of retreating from the public sphere into the 
‘fideism’ of SP, they need not be taken to deny the possibility of limited translation or the 
existence of any rational spaces between Christians and others. Rather than developing a 
single knock-down justificatory argument for Christian theism, ad hoc apologetics can be 
regarded as the attempt to offer provisional, contextual demonstrations of the assimilative 
power of Christian beliefs to offer intelligible and coherent explanations of the different 
situations Christians encounter in the world.
17
 
 
WEAK PARTICULARISM: INTRA- AND INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 
 
Comparative theology is a form of particularism which seeks such provisional, context-
specific results in the course of conversations with the religious other who is viewed not as 
steeped in inaccessible alterity but as a dialogic partner who can generate novel 
understandings of reality and with whom one can engage in a learning process.
18
 In the words 
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of perhaps its best known exponent, Francis Clooney, comparative theology is a ‘truly 
constructive theology, distinguished by its sources and ways of proceeding, by its foundation 
in more than one tradition (although the comparativist always remains rooted in one 
tradition), and by reflection which builds on that foundation, rather than simply on themes or 
by methods already articulated prior to comparative practice. Comparative theology is a 
theology deeply changed by its attention to the details of multiple religious and theological 
traditions, a theology that occurs only after comparison’.19 Hence, comparative theology is 
practised not by those who seek ‘grand theory’ along the lines of a ‘theology of religions’ but 
by those who are ‘willing to engage in detailed study, tentatively and over time’.20 In other 
words, the conversational process does not reduce the other to a replica of the same so that 
their concrete ‘otherness’ is not genuinely heard or appreciated; rather, only by allowing 
oneself to be addressed, interrupted and surprised by new insights does one move towards 
partial, tentative results. However, the very fact that comparative theologians speak of such 
moments of mutual interrogations, interjections and interlocutions shows that, even while 
they emphasize that the religious other is not a pre-fabricated entity but an elusive presence, 
structured by alternate modes of thought and practice, such alterity is not viewed through the 
lens of incommensurability.  
 
Comparative theology, then, is structured by a double moment of anti-theoretical negation 
and pro-dialogical affirmation. On the one hand, it rejects the pretensions of neutrality and 
universalist encompassment that it sees in attempts to study Religion in an objective, 
scientific manner and explicitly recognises the normative commitments that the comparative 
theologian brings to the conversations between localised texts, teachings and practices – to 
this extent it can be located in SP. Clooney firmly places ‘comparative theology’ within the 
fides quaerens intellectum tradition and argues that it aims at ‘knowing a loving God more 
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completely and intelligently’.21 On the other hand, the inter-religious dialogical engagement 
with the other traditions is structured by a critical self-consciousness which seeks tentative 
experimental results by working through topics from other religious traditions – in this aspect 
it affirms WP.
22
 The creative appropriation of the other takes place as Christian theology is 
being formulated, and is not a mere appendage to a full formed theology.
23
 Comparative 
theology, therefore, is work in continual progress, and comparative theologians themselves 
have sometimes been described as pilgrims, who temporarily inhabit the in-between spaces 
between traditions, undergo the unhomeliness that such habitation produces, and seek to 
return to their more familiar locations, creatively transformed by the processes of journeying 
and arrival.
24
      
 
Clooney’s distance from SP is clear particularly in his conviction that Christian theology 
must be practised in spaces that are at once comparative, interreligious and confessional. In 
his book Hindu God, Christian God, he seeks to reflect on theological topics such as the 
existence of God, divine embodiment and revelation from Hindu and Christian perspectives. 
For instance, Clooney shows that Hindu figures such as Jayanta Bhatta developed a ‘rational 
theology’ in defence of God’s existence while others such as Ramanuja argued that scripture 
is the only source of knowledge in matters relating to God, and these debates are structurally 
similar to ones in Christian circles over the possibility of natural theology. Thus, pointing out 
that Karl Barth’s doctrine of revelation has Hindu analogues, he claims that Barth ‘thinks like 
a Hindu’ and that certain Hindu theologians are in fact ‘Barthians’.25 Indeed, his goal is to 
‘unsettle the religious and theological boundaries that have neatly divided theologians 
according to their religions …  [W]hether  theologians are Hindu or Christian they are still 
colleagues and at least intellectually accountable to one another’.26 Clooney’s argument here 
is not that Hindu debates can be neatly mapped onto Christian ones, or vice versa, but that 
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carefully study of texts in languages such as Latin, Sanskrit and Tamil can illuminate certain 
parallels across theological boundaries between the ways in which Hindus and Christians 
have grappled with the divine reality. That is, Clooney seeks to hold together, in a creative 
tension, his point of departure in a Christian theological universe and his ongoing journey 
through the inter-textual spaces of the complexities and the densities of the Hindu theological 
universes.  
 
WP AND CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES IN BRITISH INDIA 
 
The form of WP called comparative theology, then, seeks to creatively work with elements of 
similarity and difference across religious traditions, and in this respect it has a significant 
precursor in the writings of some British Christian missionary thinkers in late colonial India 
who too struggled with the continuities and the disjunctions between the Christian message 
and the Hindu worlds. At the same time, we will also note that these thinkers affirmed the 
universal reach of the Christian gospel much more unequivocally than contemporary forms of 
WP – a theme that we will return to shortly.    
 
 
Two Scotsmen who were engaged with the ‘religions of the East’, John Nicol Farquhar 
(1861–1929) and Alfred George Hogg (1875–1954) in colonial India, wrestled with a 
question that remains alive in contemporary Christian theological discourse on interreligious 
dialogue – a question that, in fact, marks the divide between SP and WP: is Christian 
‘salvation’ the specific goal only for Christians (as SP asserts) or is the distinctively Christian 
end of ‘salvation’ somehow translatable across religious boundaries (as WP affirms)? In other 
words, they debated the question of the universality of the Christian message and the reality 
14 
 
of the ‘salvation’ wrought in Christ, even for those who do not yet have specific knowledge 
of this saving action. At the heart of this question lies a dilemma that appears in the writings 
of these two figures: if Christianity is related to the ‘religions’ simply as their fulfiller, 
Christianity’s own distinctiveness would seem to be obscured, but if the radical break 
between the two is overemphasized Christianity would arguably be unable to meaningfully 
address the human condition of those who have not yet heard the gospel.   
 
 
 
To use the terms of our earlier discussion, we will note that Farquhar’s own position was 
criticized for not affirming certain elements of SP, while these critics themselves had to 
grapple with the question of how, given their affirmation of these elements of SP, the gospel 
could be translated across religious boundaries. J.N. Farquhar argued that a ‘religious 
sensibility’, which was a central feature of human existence, had expressed itself in manifold 
ways in different religions, and all of these had to be granted some legitimacy. However, 
Christianity stood at the apex of the evolutionary scale and Christianity alone, a spiritual faith 
with an ethical dimension and based on historical facts, could satisfy those aspirations of 
human beings which had found imperfect expression in the Hindu religious schools of the 
Vedānta.27 On the basis of Matthew 5.17, ‘I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill’, Farquhar 
therefore claimed that Christianity was the crown and the fullness of the truth of the partial 
revelations of God that were present in the religions of the world, and all these imperfect and 
rudimentary fragments were to find their fulfillment in Christianity.
28
 Farquhar’s view did not 
go unchallenged in his own times, and some of his critics, who  emphasised that Christ came 
into the world not to fulfil the ‘pagan’ deities but instead of them, believed that Farquhar was, 
in effect, defending ‘idolatry’ and ‘polytheism’. Farquhar himself was quite clear that the 
hiatus between Christianity and the other religions could be bridged only when human beings 
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consciously turned towards God with utter sincerity and rejected their older beliefs and 
practices. Consequently, Farquhar’s thesis must not be mistaken for the view that all the 
world religions ‘automatically’ flow on their own into Christianity even in the absence of the 
gospel which would make their adherent realize their own imperfections and seek fulfillment 
in Christ, a concomitant of which is a radical purging of their older elements. Rather, 
Farquhar’s standpoint on religious diversity should be seen as the simultaneous affirmation of 
his views, on the one hand, that ‘the beginnings of the highest are visible in the lowest’ and, 
on the other hand, that though Hinduism possesses many valuable truths, it too ‘must die in 
order to live. It must die into Christianity’.29  
 
 
Nevertheless, some of Farquhar’s critics believed that he had not sufficiently emphasized the 
nature of the disjuncture between the religions and Christianity, on the grounds that the two 
revolved around different axes, and no gradual progression could be possible from the latter 
to the former. D. Mackichan, for instance, believed that the gospel does not supplement but 
supplants the spiritual achievements of Hinduism, and that the ‘dark shadow of failure’ lies 
across the religious history of India, for it has failed to arrive at the true knowledge of God.
30
 
Again, referring to the phrase ‘crown of Hinduism’ as ‘little more than a debating point’, A. 
Hogg doubted that it was possible to draw lines of continuity that led from the fragmentary 
truths of Hinduism to their complete fulfillment in Christianity for Christianity not only 
replaces certain aspects of the former but also fills in much that was never present in it. More 
importantly, he believed that Hindus would come to Christ only when they consciously feel 
that Christ fulfils their spiritual hunger, and it is only when this hunger is awakened in them 
that they can receive Christ.
31
 In effect, Hogg opposed the implication of the fulfilment theme 
that all human beings are in some sense ‘naturally’ Christian. A clear example of this 
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understanding of Christianity as specifically suited to fulfilling the Hindu’s ‘need for a 
Gospel’ can be found in J.R. Bacon who argued that Jesus Christ was the genuine historical 
response to that very need such that ‘[t]he two may be regarded as halves of the one great 
whole’.32 In contrast, Hogg believed that human beings do not, in fact, have such a ‘natural’ 
need for Christ, until they become conscious of it through their contact with the gospel, 
which therefore simultaneously produces it and can satisfy it. In other words, only within the 
Christian circle of faith that the right kind of seeking becomes possible, for it is by entering 
into the world of the Bible that the correct aspirations are evoked in human beings, 
aspirations which can be satisfied only by Christ.
33
 In these remarks, Hogg would almost 
seem to echo SP’s emphases on the alterity of, even incommensurability across, religious 
traditions.  
 
 
The view that the criterion of religious truth is not some form of trans-culturally dispersed 
‘religious experience’ but Christ himself, who is the ‘criterion’ to determine where truth is to 
be found, also appears in Rudolf Otto in an early comparative study between Christianity and 
bhakti religiosity. Drawing an analogy from crystallography, Otto writes that just as two 
crystals which have been precipitated from the same chemical solution have, because of their 
different axial systems, fundamentally different structures and properties, so too the ‘spirit of 
a religion is decidedly determined by the axis  on which it turns, by the centre about which all 
the other religious ideas are grouped, to which they point, and from which they get their 
peculiar tone, and the whole obtains its individual structure’.34  After claiming that the bhakti 
religion of India possesses certain characteristics which bear an ‘astonishing similarity’ to the 
central Christian themes of ‘sin’, ‘salvation’, and  ‘grace’, he argues, almost in the style of 
SP, that Christianity and the bhakti religion revolve round two entirely different axes because 
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the ‘spirits’ of the two are distinct from each another. Consequently, to move from the world 
of the Gitā to that of the Gospel involves a ‘complete displacement of the axis’ and not some 
gradual evolution.
35
     
 
HOGG’S PARTICULARISM AS ‘COMPARATIVE THEOLOGY’? 
 
Our discussion has shown that Hogg and Otto strikingly anticipate some of the key concerns 
of comparative theology – religions such as Christianity have a sui generis character, and 
they should not be viewed as instances of an abstract religious consciousness. Almost 
echoing SP, Hogg argued that while there were several resonances between elements of 
Christian doctrine and Hindu conceptions of the deity, there was also an ‘irreducible surd of 
difference’ between the two in that the Hindu does not confess Christ as the only Saviour.36  
At the same time, however, in the manner of comparative theology’s emphasis on WP, he 
resisted the view that this ‘surd of difference’ between Christian and non-Christian responses 
to God were to be read as genuinely incommensurable; rather, he argued that one should 
speak of degrees of continuity between the responses to God.
37
 Indeed, all the theologians we 
have encountered so far – ranging from Farquhar on the one hand, and his critics such as 
Mackichan, Hogg and others – would argue that while there is no ‘automatic’ rectilinear 
transition from the religions to Christ, the religions and the Christian gospel are not totally 
disjointed either, and consequently conversations can take place across their boundaries. 
Hogg’s book The Christian Message to the Hindu is a classic example of such a textually-
grounded interreligious conversation on the field: after encountering Hindu undergraduates 
who sought a Christian response to the problem of ‘unmerited suffering’, Hogg, who was the 
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Principal of Madras Christian College (1930–38) felt that it was one to ‘which the Christian 
Church has formulated no answer’. He writes: ‘That controversial challenge sent me to a 
study of Hindu thought about karma … Also it made me study afresh the Biblical revelation 
… I was not theologically so ignorant as to be unaware of how much the enigma of 
unmerited suffering had done to shape the development of Old Testament faith, and how 
relevant to it was the New Testament teaching about the Cross of Christ. But I began to see 
all this in a new alignment which presented me with issues more clearly cut, and deepened 
my understanding.’38 As he responds to the Vedāntic Hindu doctrine of karma and rebirth, 
Hogg writes that it asserts that there is a ‘relative proportionment’39 between the empirical 
joys and sorrows of an individual and her moral deserts in this and previous lives, even if this 
proportionment is not readily visible or manifest to the eye. Hogg goes on to emphasise that 
there are two strands underlying this conception, one of which is the doctrine of 
transmigration and the other the view that there is a moral order in the universe so that no 
individual experiences unjust suffering, and Hogg writes that whatever may be a Christian 
theologian’s final conclusion concerning the former, the latter remains crucial to Christian 
reflections on the problem of suffering. In any case, Christian theologians have not developed 
any systematic theory for the question of the ‘distribution of suffering’ among human beings, 
and the ultimate reason for this, Hogg argues, is the Christian conviction that in the midst of 
all worldly travails Christ, who suffered more than anyone, is present to those who are in 
agony, and that as the loving God He did not want to remain extraneous to their struggles on 
earth. Our concern here is not to analyse the merits of Hogg’s understanding of the Christian 
doctrine of the atonement, nor to indicate how Hindu thinkers might respond to Hogg’s 
articulation of their position, but to point out how he echoes the comparative theologian who 
does not presume to start from a position of neutrality or a meta-theory of Religion, but 
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struggles creatively with the tension of rootedness in the home tradition of Christianity and 
vulnerability to the truths in the other religion’s doctrinal statements. 
 
Yet, there is also a crucial difference between Hogg’s comparative theology and many 
contemporary practitioners of this modality of interreligious encounter – while the latter often 
shy away from any apologetic element in interreligious dialogue, Hogg did not, as we noted 
above, see them as opposed. For instance, while arguing that both similarity and difference 
are important for the comparative theologian, James L. Fredericks writes that he nevertheless 
places the emphasis on difference because he seeks to avoid theories that would annul the 
alterity of other religions.
40
 In contrast, Hogg’s comparative theology was more firmly based 
on an analysis of the competing religious truth-claims across the ‘surd of difference’ that he 
identified between Christianity and Hinduism, and his book was an attempt to present what 
he believed to be the merits of the Christian understanding of Christ’s sacrificial death over 
the Hindu understanding of karma and rebirth as a response to the problem of unmerited 
suffering. Thus, he argued that while for Christians the fundamental ‘question’ is the 
direction they must take to obtain salvation with the ‘answer’ given to them through God’s 
atoning death in Christ, for Hindus this pair is constituted by their search for release from the 
cycle of rebirth and the multiple ways of liberation propounded by the schools and sects. 
Even further, he could write that Hindus would come to Christ only when they consciously 
feel that Christ fulfils their spiritual hunger, and it is only when this hunger is awakened in 
them that they can receive Christ. Thus, what Christ fulfils ‘is not Hinduism but the need of 
which India has begun to be conscious, the need of which He [Christ] has made her begin to 
feel consciousness, by making her feel conscious of which, He has made her no longer quite 
Hindu’.41  
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THE DIGNITY OF DIFFERENCE AND INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 
 
The conceptual, cultural and historical shifts that have taken place between the times of Hogg 
and contemporary comparative theologians such as Fredericks partly help to explain why the 
latter are relatively uneasy with affirming ‘similarity’ across religious traditions. In various 
strands of contemporary socio-cultural life in the west, as well as some sectors of western 
academia, the emphasis falls squarely on difference – whether in multiculturalism, 
Wittgensteinian language-games, social anthropological relativism, and so on, the motto 
seems to be that difference is intrinsically dignified. This motto can be seen at work 
especially in the post-liberal theology of George Lindbeck and Hans Frei, which veers in the 
direction of SP and argues that the ‘truth’ of Christian discourse should be understood in 
terms of the communitarian uses to which it is put and not because it corresponds to a reality 
that is universally accessible. Therefore, a clear distinction is to be made between ‘dogmatic 
theology’ and ‘apologetics’: theology is to be practiced within the horizon of the scriptural 
world and should not be unduly concerned with establishing its meaningfulness to skeptics 
and atheists or developing foundations from which its truth can be demonstrated to those 
outside the Christian form of life. The meaning of the Bible lies in its literary world and not 
in historical events or contexts that they report, so that the primary concern of Christian 
theology is the description of the reality of Christ in the scriptural story rather than the 
translation of this reality into extra-biblical categories.
42
 Without entering into the extensive 
literature on post-liberal theology, we note that its opposition to the ‘translation’ projects of 
inter-religious dialogue would seem to conflict with the universalist faith that the Christian 
message somehow speaks to an objectively characterized condition of all human beings. 
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While the SP of post-liberal theology regards statements about God, Christ, sin and 
redemption as ‘true’ only intra-systematically, the ‘objects’ of these statements are, however, 
not only ‘performed’ in a liturgical sense but also pre-exist the confessional setting. 
Therefore, the Christian community does, after all, make truth-claims about the world, a 
world that its members share with skeptics, atheists and adherents of other religious 
traditions, though, of course, they view its creaturely status and hope for its redemption 
through divine grace in sometimes very different ways. While we may have to participate in 
specific liturgical contexts to learn the meaning of the statement ‘The Triune God is our 
refuge and strength’, its truth or falsity is ultimately dependent not just on how it is used for 
intra-mural edification but also on how things are independently of the Christian 
worshipper.
43
 Therefore, unless we assume that the gospel is meant, in a purely intra-textual 
manner, only for those already within the Christian faith, the scriptural text must link up with 
the reader who brings a specific world of meaning to it.
44
 
 
DEBATING CHRISTIAN PARTICULARISM 
 
In sum, we have arrived at three major conclusions in the preceding sections. First, the debate 
between Christian theologians over SP and WP is ultimately one over the possibility of 
‘translations’ of the Christian message into vocabulary that can be shared across religious 
boundaries. While post-liberal theologians usually are hesitant to engage in such projects, the 
conceptual pressures of the doctrine that salvation is not restricted for a specific section of 
humanity push them in the direction of WP. Indeed, as Joseph DiNoia puts it, the universality 
of the divine salvific will ‘has a global or overall regulative force for the construal of central 
Christian doctrines and, by implication, of doctrines about other religions and their 
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adherents’.45 However, and this is the crucial point, the affirmation of the objective – as 
opposed to the merely intra-textually subjective – reality of the Christ-event as reaching out 
in some way through all time and space implies that Christians who seek to carry the gospel 
to non-Christians have to engage in some form of communication such as interreligious 
dialogue. Paul J. Griffiths puts this point even more strongly when he affirms that Christians 
who hold that the salvation of non-Christians is important are under an ‘ethical imperative’ to 
engage in positive apologetics.
46
 That is, the question, ‘Why Jesus Christ?’, becomes a live 
one especially in the context of interreligious dialogue when Christians may be called upon to 
provide reasons for their faith centred in Christ.  
 
Second, the debate over SP and WP is, therefore, integrally connected to another raging 
dispute among Christian theologians over the possibility of ‘natural theology’, that is, 
whether one can develop a comprehensive account of the Christian hope in terms that would 
be accessible to non-Christians. Post-liberal theologians sometimes argue that human 
reasoning that tries to proceed independently of God’s self-disclosure in Christ cannot arrive 
at the full content of the Christian revelation, and no cognitive defence can be provided of the 
Christian scheme through which Christians organize reality. They are opposed by theologians 
who seek to integrate the Christian vision, revolving around Jesus Christ as the criterion, with 
the common world that Christians share with those outside the horizon of their faith.
47
 F.C. 
Coppleston, for instance, argues that while Christianity did not arrive as a philosophical 
system and while its heart is a personal relationship to God, ‘it by no means follows that any 
attempt to work out a synthesis in the light of Christian faith is to embark on a project 
contrary to the spirit of the Christian religion’.48 Theologians such as Coppleston would 
therefore argue that while it may be true that Christians do not typically arrive at their faith 
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after a meticulous analysis of arguments offered in its support, and their faith is nurtured and 
sustained within communities that worship the Triune God, patterns of reasoning which seek 
to show that the Christian understanding of Jesus Christ is the best explanation for our world 
can highlight its plausibility and coherence not only to Christian themselves but also to 
agnostics, atheists and inquirers from other religious backgrounds. 
 
Third, the dividing lines between SP and WP are not always sharply-drawn, for, as we noted 
in the case of Werpehowski, it is possible for theologians who are at the SP end of the 
spectrum to articulate ‘reasons’ in defence of Christian faith. Proponents of SP could 
maintain that they reject a priori ‘thick descriptions’ of the conversational partner, while they 
accept certain ‘thin descriptions’ drawn from their home Christian traditions, and that the 
latter, with due attention to context, can sometimes be translated across religious boundaries. 
The difference between these two possibilities is highlighted in a somewhat different context 
by Richard Rorty who argues that we should ‘distinguish between the following two theses: 
(1) there is no single commensurating language, known in advance, which will provide an 
idiom into which to translate any new theory, poetic idiom, or native culture; and (2) there are 
unlearnable languages’.49 While SP seems to affirm (2), certain standpoints on interreligious 
dialogue which less ambiguously assert WP would claim that it is possible to read the texts of 
one’s own traditions alongside those of others, thereby leading to extensions, interrogations, 
transmutations, variations, and even losses, of the established meanings of the former.
50
 
These perspectives have sometimes employed the insights of hermeneutical perspectivism 
developed by figures such as Gadamer and Ricoeur to steer a via media between the thesis of 
radical untranslatibility and the demand of a prior common ground to facilitate conversations 
across boundaries. Ricoeur talks of a hermeneutic arc composed of three phases: first, we 
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approach a text with our own presuppositions, interests, backgrounds, commitments and 
prejudices, which constitute our naïve understanding; second, critical analysis in which we 
seek distantiation from our ‘anticipations of meaning’ through methods such as historical 
analysis, literary criticism and so on, and allow ourselves to be confronted by the ‘objectivity’ 
of the text; and third, the ‘second naivete’ in which we imaginatively appropriate the alterity 
of the text as a resource for ourselves in the present.
51
 Ricoeur’s claim that we can, in this 
manner, exercise linguistic hospitality towards alien horizons of thought is echoed, as we 
have seen, in Clooney’s ‘comparative theology’, which sees religious identity not in static but 
in relational terms and seeks to develop modes of dialogical inter-being across boundaries. 
On the one hand, Clooney affirms that such inter-textual study across religious boundaries is 
guided not by ‘pure reason’ but by reason that has been ‘deeply influenced by prior religious 
dispositions’.52 Therefore, he agrees with Hindu theistic theologians against their Buddhist 
opponents partly because the former more closely resemble his own Christian theological 
standpoint. On the other hand, however, this is not an a priori projection of Christian 
predilections onto the Hindu other: Clooney highlights how Hindu views on the nature of the 
ultimate reality, divine embodiment, and so on are articulated from distinctive Hindu 
standpoints with their specific doctrinal structures. For instance, he notes that while the 
Hindu understanding of the avatara resonates with the Christian confession of the enfleshed 
God, Hindu theologians such as Ramanuja would, for reasons that are internal to their 
Vedantic worldview, deny that the divine embodiment is capable of undergoing any worldly 
suffering.      
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CONCLUSION 
 
Our historical excursus into the debate between Farquhar and his critics such as Hogg shows, 
pace post-liberal theologians, that the concern to develop the standpoints of the Christian 
faith and interreligious dialogue are not mutually opposed enterprises. Further, this historical 
exchange helps us to see that interreligious dialogue is rooted in certain theological 
‘presuppositions’ about how the religious other is to be approached, understood and engaged. 
Kristin Kiblinger argues that not all forms of ‘theology of religions’, that is, attempts to 
develop a Christian framework to apprehend religious diversity, are guilty of committing the 
transgressions that comparative theologians sometimes attribute to them. In fact, we cannot 
shift to the task of reading the religious texts of other traditions without some presuppositions 
about the other, because these presuppositions guide us in how we perform these readings. 
For instance, if we read the Gitā with the view that we can encounter God in it, this 
presupposition already points to a certain theology of religions.
53
 Kiblinger’s view that the 
two enterprises are not antagonistic is endorsed by Clooney himself who speaks of a division 
of theological labour between the practitioners of the two. Given that many scholars are 
engaged in the theology of religions, Clooney speaks of the need for scholars who undertake 
detailed, textual study of religions, and argues that ‘in the long run, we should be able to 
agree that theology of religions and comparative theology mirror and imply one another, and 
even help one another’. 54  This is a position, as we have noted, that would have been 
applauded by Hogg as well.  
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At the same time, it is important to emphasise that comparative theology has taken firm 
strides since the days of Otto, Hogg and others, especially with respect to where the ‘surd 
differences’ between Christianity and Hinduism are precisely to be located. For instance, 
Otto’s claims regarding the radical alterity of Hindu bhakti are sometimes overdetermined by 
his Lutheran notions of sola gratia, divine wrath, and so on, which shape his understanding 
of bhakti as, in effect, a Pelagian striving on the part of the Hindu devotee. Thus, he argues 
that in the ‘Indian religion of grace’, the world remains devoid of any ultimate value, the 
devotees do not experience a sense of personal unworthiness before the personal Lord and so 
on – these are ‘differences’ which contemporary scholars of south Indian bhakti, such as 
Clooney himself, have tried to deconstruct. Lindbeck therefore rightly notes that 
‘bilingualism’ is a rare achievement, which highlights the difficulties of extra-mural 
communication across religious boundaries.
55
 However, while Lindbeck sees such difficulties 
as insuperable, comparative theologians who do not accept his thesis of untranslatibility 
across self-contained religious frameworks instead speak of situational, dialectical, 
hermeneutical encounters in which religious spaces are metaphorically re-visualised.
56
Indeed, 
after speaking of the ‘axial’ difference between Christian ‘grace’ and Hindu bhakti, Otto 
himself goes on to emphasise that one must not ignore the presence of the governing idea of 
one religious system as the auxiliary elements in the other. For example, he argues that the 
consciousness of ‘sin’ is not, after all, entirely absent in the bhakti religions; whereas 
Ramanuja’s notion of ātma-siddhi, the realization of the finite self in communion with the 
Lord, is not totally unknown either to some of the Christian traditions and in fact resonates 
with the Christian motifs of the ‘fulness of life’, ‘blessedness’, and ‘real being’.57 Here Otto 
emphasises the theme of WP that is common to contemporary comparative theologians, that 
conversations with other religions can often foster conversations within the home religious 
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traditions, setting up critical correlations where the accent can fall sometimes on similarity, 
and sometimes on difference. 
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